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THE FACT THAT Joseph Stalin should be considered one 
of the great, terrible criminals of the Twentieth Century is self-evident 
but nonetheless bears repeating. It takes little imagination to point to 
those calamities that befell the Soviet Union during the Stalin years, 
and see behind them his shadowy hand. The question that has 
dominated the historiography in recent decades, however, has been 
‘how.’ In what manner did Stalin perpetrate his crimes? Did that 
shadowy hand wield a revolver, or the strings of puppets, either 
directly or indirectly doing Stalin’s bidding?  
It was with no small excitement, therefore, that, in 2003, 
Jonathan Brent and Vladimir Naumov published Stalin’s Last Crime, 
a book that has stood alone in its field, virtually unchallenged by 
scholars of Soviet history, for a decade. The subject - the so-called 
Doctors’ Plot of the late 1940s and early 1950s - has not received the 
attention that such a mysterious yet pivotal sequence of events should 
have; both historians remind us with their introductory remarks that 
Churchill noted to Eisenhower in 1953 that the “doctor story [...] 
must cut very deeply into the communist heart and structure” (p.1). 
                                                 
1 Originally published in New York by Harper Collins in 2003. The version of the 
text used for the purpose of this review is as follows: Jonathan Brent and Vladimir P. 
Naumov, Stalin’s Last Crime: The Plot against the Jewish Doctors, 1948-1953 (New York: 
Perennial, 2004.) 
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The first third of the book is devoted to the death of Andrei 
Zhdanov, the leading Communist Party official, which Brent and 
Naumov see as the catalyst for all to come. This opening drama reads 
like an intricate murder mystery, worthy of Sir Arthur Conan Doyle. 
Zhdanov, having suffered a collapse, was sent to recuperate under the 
care of Kremlin Hospital doctors at the health centre at Valdai, on 13 
July 1948. By 31 August, he was dead, the victim of a massive heart 
attack. What makes the Zhdanov case remarkable was not that 
Zhdanov died, since Soviet medicine, in spite of the propaganda, 
always lagged behind its Western counterparts, and Zhdanov had a 
history of poor cardiac health. However, the security services had 
been warned, at least a week before the death, that Zhdanov’s 
treatment at Valdai was insufficient and liable to lead to disaster. 
These concerns were raised by Lidia Timashuk, an electrocardiogram 
technician and, unbeknownst to her colleagues, an agent of the state’s 
domestic security organ, the MGB. Timashuk’s warnings, both to the 
Kremlin bodyguard and to her handler at the MGB, were hushed up 
in 1948, but they became central to the case that would ultimately be 
brought against the doctors in the early 1950s.  
In the intervening years, Stalin followed the pattern of terror 
that had served him in the past. The Leningrad wing of the Party, 
which had been overseen by Zhdanov before his death at Valdai, 
became the focal point of mass arrests and executions after January 
1949. These purges, which became known as the Leningrad Affair, 
cost the lives of Central Committee member Alexei Kuznetsov and 
the eminent economist Nikolai Voznesensky, among many hundreds 
of others. In 1951, Viktor Abakumov, the head of the MGB, was 
denounced by one of his underlings, the interrogator Ryumin, and 
accused of involvement in a plot to kill leading communists; 
Abakumov would eventually be shot in 1954. In 1952 the Jewish 
Anti-Fascist Committee, which had organised Jewish resistance to the 
Nazis during the Great Patriotic War, was accused of “anti-Soviet” 
activities, its leading members placed on trial and sentenced to death 
or the gulag. Throughout these years, and increasing in desperate 
fervour until March 1953, the official and semiofficial agitation 
against those in the medical profession who had apparently conspired 
with Abakumov to kill off the leadership reached a fever pitch, but 
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died with Stalin; by August 1953, Pravda had acknowledged that the 
reasons for a purge had now passed, and the affair quietly disappeared 
from public view.  
These events, the authors claim, cannot be unconnected. 
After all, who is Stalin, Breaker of Nations, but history’s Professor 
Moriarty? Timashuk’s warnings, according to this reading, were 
ignored precisely because Stalin wanted Zhdanov to perish during his 
“health cure.” Indeed, the signs were there that Zhdanov’s influence 
was waning. As early as 1942, he had been criticised for his 
organisation of the defence and survival of Leningrad during its 900-
day siege, which had arguably saved the city but had undermined the 
central power of directives from Moscow (p.71). After the war, 
Zhdanov began his rise to prominence, but this was interrupted in 
1947 by the actions of his son, Yuri. The younger Zhdanov, a 
prominent scientist, delivered a speech criticising the work of the 
charlatan botanist Trofim Lysenko, who happened to be the favourite 
of Stalin. Enraged at this attack on Lysenko, Stalin promised to 
“punish the guilty in exemplary fashion” (p.78). Other indications tell 
us that Zhdanov had lost the favour of his friend and boss. Despite 
requesting that his health cure be spent in the south, Zhdanov was 
sent to the colder north. While there, his position on the Central 
Committee was subsumed by Georgi Malenkov, his bitter rival. More 
to the point, on 7 August Pravda published an open letter from the 
younger Zhdanov, apologising for his “whole series of serious errors” 
in criticising Lysenko. At this point, Andrei Zhdanov’s custodial care 
seemed to take a turn for the worse. The letter was a plea for mercy 
by Yuri, but it was also a coded signal to his father’s doctors-cum-
murderers. “[T]hey took a series of negative steps that demonstrated 
that they had understood their assignment”, Brent and Naumov tell 
us (p.85), and by the end of the month Zhdanov was dead, and the 
one doctor - Timashuk - who had sounded the alarm about the 
“incorrect” treatment “without any lawful grounds” had been ignored 
by Stalin precisely because this incorrect treatment was Stalin’s intent 
in the first place.  
Thereafter, Stalin sought to cover his tracks. Zhdanov’s 
death cleared the way for a purging of the Leningrad Party organs, 
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much as the murder of Sergei Kirov in 1934 had facilitated the Great 
Terror against the Party as a whole. The doctors who had treated 
Zhdanov would be denounced, Timashuk’s testimonies “discovered”, 
and the state security apparatus would be torn apart, not because of 
an antisemitic crusade dressed up as a campaign against “rootless 
cosmopolitanism” or “nationalist agitators” or those “poisoned with 
bourgeois nationalism”, but as an “exercise of [Stalin’s] enormous 
power” (p.5). Thus, our Georgian Moriarty initiated his capricious 
and murderous plans, and it was only his fortuitous death (perhaps, 
the historians suggest, at the instigation of Beria) that saved the Soviet 
Union from another, arbitrary Great Terror. 
Brent and Naumov’s recounting of their various case studies 
is impressive, demonstrating mastery of the facts. Zhdanov’s cardiac 
history, for instance, is dissected clinically - much, they might argue, 
as his doctors should have done if they had actually wished their 
patient to live - and the various testimonies, minutes, letters, and 
other accounts by and about the doctors add an authenticity to the 
account. Yet it is these details that prove to be the book’s undoing. 
Both historians have placed Stalin at the centre of a web of intrigue in 
which the state apparatus was to be subjected to a terror against itself, 
driven by itself. So, for example, we have the typical case of the MGB 
interrogator, Ryumin, interrogating the Jewish doctor, Etinger, in 
direct contravention of orders from his superior, Abakumov. Ryumin 
subsequently denounced Abakumov for protecting the elderly, ailing 
Etinger from charges of being a subversive anti-Soviet terrorist 
(pp.114-120). Ryumin would ultimately be denounced as well, neatly 
tidying this circle of conspiracy; Brent and Naumov would suggest 
that this would remove any direct link to Stalin and his crimes.  
Yet where is Stalin in the case of Zhdanov? For Stalin was 
still human, and his commands and wishes were not communicated 
via telepathy. Yet this seems to be what Brent and Naumov would 
have us believe. Both admit that “no directive from Stalin ordering 
[Zhdanov’s] death will ever be found; no record of the conversations 
among the doctors in Valdai [...] exists, except as they have been 
reconstructed by witnesses who often had an axe to grind” (p.8). 
Upon what, then, can these two otherwise conscientious historians 
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build their case that Zhdanov’s doctors “understood their 
assignment” to allow Zhdanov’s death, once his son’s open apology 
to Stalin had been published in Pravda? Even Khrushchev, willing 
enough to ascribe blame to Stalin, noted that Zhdanov’s attending 
physicians were “the best and most trusted of their profession” 
(p.66). They were not assassins, nor agents of state security (with the 
exception of Timashuk, who raised the alarm). Furthermore, the 
method of setting this “assignment” strains credibility. The reader is 
expected to believe that the publication of a letter by Yuri Zhdanov in 
a newspaper with a readership numbering in the tens of millions 
would be interpreted by a panel of surgeons as a signal to scrimp on 
the care of Yuri’s father, who might or might not die as a result of 
this less than complete medical attention. To the historians, the 
Pravda letter told the Valdai doctors to “do what you know is right 
under the circumstances”, and it “played a part in whatever unspoken 
medical deliberations went forward in the troubled atmosphere of 
Valdai” (p.85). Yet it is precisely because these deliberations were 
“unspoken” that we simply cannot jump to such conclusions, since 
neither Brent nor Naumov can offer any evidence that such 
deliberations even occurred. So many of the linchpins of the book’s 
arguments are based upon supposition and guesswork, in fact, that 
they become functionally meaningless. “The Plot was roughly 
diamond-shaped”, we are told, in one of the more prosaic passages. 
“There was never a straight line from Stalin to his enemy” (p. 333). 
The trouble is in finding any line between Stalin and his enemy. An 
essential aspect of the purging of the MGB, for instance, was the 
removal of Abakumov, and to this end the historians charge that “to 
get Abakumov, Stalin employed Ryumin” (p.333). The choice of 
words is unfortunate, since it implies that Ryumin was part of Stalin’s 
plans. He was not; Ryumin, in fact, had denounced Abakumov 
because he had been reprimanded and, having once before been 
denounced, the interrogator felt a pressing, urgent, but personal need 
to cast doubt on his accuser (pp.113-118). If this grand conspiracy 
was to work, its success relied upon discrediting Abakumov, and this 
was accomplished through the individual machinations of one of his 
underlings, not through the actions of Stalin himself.  
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In the final analysis, the connection between Stalin and the 
actions detailed in this volume is often so obscure as to not be 
evident at all. The historians may treat this as evidence of the 
extraordinary secrecy and cleverness of this Machiavellian schemer. In 
attempting to prove this, though, they have ascribed powers to Stalin 
that are not supported by their impressive source material. Instead of 
Stalin’s plans being laid bare by this modern Holmes-and-Watson 
duo, the plot becomes so convoluted, so complex, so dependent on 
contingencies that Stalin could not possibly have influenced, that he is 
painted less as a Georgian Moriarty and more like the infernal Woland 
of Bulgakov’s The Master and Margarita, possessing magical abilities 
to bend reality. In the absence of a pistol-toting feline offsider, 
however, we must conclude that Brent and Naumov, regardless of 
their skills as researchers, have stumbled into the realm of speculative 
fiction. Or, perhaps more fittingly, they have fallen into the pattern of 
evidence practiced by Ryumin, who once told a prisoner: “Tell us 
everything, and we ourselves will decide what is true” (p. 191). As is 
so often the curse of Soviet history, what to the historians seems true 
does not always correspond with what is likely.  
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